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Abstract 
Comparing the economic performances between UK and Euroland, 
the appropriate and obvious question should be: why does not 
Euroland replace its euro with the British pound? However, economy 
does not represent all the interests of the human beings. They believe 
in values beyond the economy. Right! It may well be that Euroland 
citizens, once with the euro, feel much more confiance in themselves, 
as part of a larger world, as they trust the monetary and political 
decision makers of the EU Institutions. If that was the truth, the 
European integration process should proceed just like a ball thrown 
against standing skittle-pins waiting to be got down! Unfortunately, 
that is not the case. The authors try to point out some reasons to 
understand those British people who love to look at the euro 
experience, sitting in their armchairs and, above all, without loosing 
their national pound.  
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1. Introduction 
From January 1st, 1973, UK is in every respect a country member of 
the European Union (EU) and consequently is one of the addressees 
of its huge legislation and effects deriving from it. On February 27th, 
1992 the Treaty on European Union (thereafter Treaty) is signed in 
Maastricht and represents the beginning of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) creation to be achieved through three 
stages. On October 1997, British government, by means of his 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr Gordon Brown, using the Treaty 
opting-out clause, announces the intention of non-participating to the 
third stage, the one that would have led the twelve country members 
of the EU to adopt one European currency, the euro. Hence, UK 
maintains its own autonomy in the fields of monetary policy and exchange 
rate policy. UK maintains its British pound as national currency unless a 
popular referendum, to be shortly held, will indicate the will of 
replacing the British pound for the euro. UK, however, participates to 
the European System of Central Banks (Esbc) where EU monetary 
policy is decided through the Governor Council and the Executive 
Committee. In other words the presence of the UK in the EMU 
testimonies the non-necessary coincidence between a monetary union 
and one single currency1. Nevertheless, the passage towards a 
monetary union with a single currency makes complete and mature an 
incomplete union2. The British choice comes from a number of 
criticisms either on the EU economic policies, the monetary policy 
and the rate of exchange policy, to be accepted by accepting the euro, 
or on the negative result of a number of economic tests, which will be 
explained in the next sections. In this paper we point out that the 
British opting-out choice might be explained not only by economic 
worrying views, but more important, by political concerns. We shall 
start however with the former, leaving the latter to be discussed later. 
 
                                                 
1 AAVV Dal Piano Delors all’unione economica e monetaria Cedam, Padova, 1991, p.85. 
2 Delors Report. 
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2. On The Renounce of the Exchange Rate Policy 
Building a single currency implies, as known, the disappearance of the 
exchange rate policy for a country within a union. A country will be 
keen to accept a new currency if it is convinced that the advantages of 
having it will prevail over the disadvantages. Therefore, is the UK 
convinced that the loss of the exchange rate policy implies more 
advantages than disadvantages? Though this point should not be the 
most important one when compared with the others, still it concurs 
to understand the British view on the euro. 
As Mundell (1961) showed3, the evaluation of costs and benefits of 
building up a monetary union with a single currency takes place 
through the theory of the optimal currency area (Oca)4. An Oca will be 
justified if advantages will exceed disadvantages.  
According to that theory, in the presence of fixed rates of 
exchange, an eventual negative asymmetric shock that hit the 
economy of a country A will cause, at the same time, a worsening in 
its balance of payments and an improvement in that of a country B. 
                                                 
3 MUNDELL, R. A theory of optimal currency areas in American Economic Review, 1961, 
pp.657-665. Mundell analysis is the first exposition of the subject and is preceded by 
works of Meade (Nobel 1977) such as MEADE, J. The balance of payment problems of a 
European free trade area in Economic Journal, 1957, pp.379-396. and SCITOVSKY, T 
such as L’integrazione economica dell’Europa occidentale dal puntodi vista della teoria 
Feltrinelli, Milano, 1961. 
4 The concept of Oca, the traditional one, is linked to the debate on the choice of a fixed or flexible 
rates of exchange regime to achieve a re-equilibrium of the balance of payment, debate developed in 
consequence of the crisis of the fixed rates of exchange international monetary system built up in 
1944 at Bretton Woods and of the establishment, of a flexible rates of exchange regime. 
(SPAGNOLO, L.V. L’equilibrio in un’economia aperta Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2002, 
p.160). More exactly, once cleared the inability of both the regimes to assure an 
international stability, the Oca was an alternative model represented by a monetary 
union within which there had to be one currency. In the Mundell view, as not all 
countries take advantage from a flexible rates of exchange regime, it was better that 
i) a number n of countries be grouped in a number m of monetary areas, ii) inside 
each monetary area it was appropriate a fixed rate of exchange, iii) between the m 
monetary areas there ought to be flexible rates of exchanges iv) the flexible rates of 
exchanges between monetary areas would be optimal if internal mobility and 
external immobility of factors, labour and capital, (ricardian) hypotheses were 
respected (SPAGNOLO, L.V. op. cit. p.161). 
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Because of the presence of a fixed rate of exchange, the re-
equilibrium in the balance of payments of the two countries will take 
place if, and only if, at least two conditions are met: a perfect 
flexibility of wages and a high mobility in the labour market. In fact, 
country A, because of a lack of demand will experience lower prices, 
higher unemployment, a weakening of trade unions, and consequently 
lower wages. Country B will experience exactly the opposite effect: an 
excess of demand, higher prices, higher employment, a strengthening 
of trade unions, and consequently, higher wages. Thus, country A, 
because of the lower wages, will increase the demand of labour, 
employment and output. Country B, because of the higher wages, will 
decrease employment and output. Prices and wages will increase in 
country A and decrease in country B, re-establishing the external 
equilibrium in both the countries. 
In the presence of flexible rates of exchange, an eventual negative 
asymmetric shock on country A will cause a worsening of its balance 
of payments, deriving from a worsening either in its current account 
balance, due to a decrease in the exports, or in the short run capital 
flows, due to an increase in the short run capital outflows. The 
domestic currency will depreciate and, at the same time, the currency 
of a country B will appreciate. Such depreciation and appreciation will 
increase exports and capital inflows in country A and decrease 
exports and increase capital outflows in country B. The balance of 
payments of country A will improve, while the one of country B will 
worsen, re-establishing the external equilibrium in both the countries.  
On one side flexible rates of exchange reflect the up and down of 
the markets, and the only danger with them might be due to high 
exchange rates volatility and inflation without the possibility for it to 
be exported to the rest of the world. On the other side fixed rates of 
exchange need the fulfilment of the two above conditions (i.e. perfect 
flexibility of prices and wages and high mobility in the labour market), 
conditions that the UK believes do not exist, or, at least, do not yet 
exist within Euroland. Evidently, apart from the above mentioned 
advantages of having flexible rates of exchange, the UK believes that 
the danger linked to the flexible rates of exchange is preferable to the 
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non existence of the flexibility of wages and labour mobility within 
the EU member countries.  
Thus, the EU area might not be an Oca and consequently the 
disadvantages of abandoning the exchange rate policy is not at all 
balanced by the advantages of replacing the British pound with the 
euro.  
In fact the exchange rate policy, if successful, may only temporary 
help an economy to draw a sigh of relief, but cannot be thought as 
the right one for pursuing stability and growth. 
On one hand it is true that for an exchange rate policy to be 
successful we need i) the fulfilment of the Bickerdicke-Robinson 
condition, according to which the balance of the current account 
improves, when the national currency depreciates, if, and only if, it 
will result (pXX/pMM)X+M>1, where X and M are the quantities of 
exports and imports, pX and pM their prices, and X and M their 
elasticities to a devaluations of the rate of exchange5, and ii) that the 
other countries with which the country devaluating has more 
exchanges will not devaluate too their own currencies. On the other 
hand it is also true that, in the absence of prices and wages perfect 
flexibility and high labour mobility, yet there will not be a convincing 
reason to participate to a union. 
However, examples of success in using appropriately the exchange 
rate policy to help the national economy come from the government 
decisions in France during the years ’82-’83, when the devaluations of 
the French franc helped the domestic economy to recover from years 
of stagnation. Denmark during 1982, and above all Belgium, whose 
devaluation of 8,5% improved the percentage of current accounts 
from -3,5% in 1981 to +2,0% in 1986, and of employment, in the 
same period, from -2% to +1,0% when the average within the Union 
was +0,8%. 
If, as we mentioned above, under certain condition fixed exchange 
rates might be appropriate, why should the UK believe that those 
conditions (i.e. perfect flexibility of wages and high mobility in the 
labour market) are not met in Euroland? The answer passes through 
                                                 
5 See, among others, SPAGNOLO, L.V. op. cit.  
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two basic points: the institutional differences in the labour market in 
the countries participating to the union and the political attitude of the 
governments of those countries towards unemployment and inflation.  
About the first point, countries may be different according to the 
degree of concentration of their trade unions: the higher that degree, 
the higher the proportion of workers represented by the same 
institution, the stronger the pressures put on employers to obtain 
higher wages6. Within the Union, the UK is characterised by a low 
degree of concentration of the trade unions, compared with that of 
other countries7, and it might be difficult to achieve one 
homogeneous degree within the Union.  
About the second point, countries assign different weights to the 
trade off between the rate of increase of wages and the level of 
unemployment. Some of them are more prone than others to accept a 
lower employment rate, due to higher wages; others will advocate the 
idea that the rate of unemployment must not go beyond a maximum 
level which, if exceeded, will imply the use of expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies. That is to say each country has its own utility 
function satisfied at the point where the government utility function 
(the demand of labour of the whole community) meets the trade 
union’s utility function (the level of real wages claimed by trade 
unions)8.  
Traditionally, on one hand the UK has always considered 
economic liberalism as an unquestionable priority to help growth and 
development and, on the other one9, has never forgotten to support 
families, schools, researches, and social services in the light of the 
Beveridge philosophy10. Any complete union, obviously, entails an 
agreement about the two points above, and the UK might be 
                                                 
6 DE GRAUWE, P. The economics of Monetary Union Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
7 SACHS, J. D.and BRUNO, M. Economics and worldwide stagflation Harvard University, 
1995. 
8 SOLOW, R. La moderna teoria macroeconomica Laterza, 1998; SOLOW, R. Inflazione, 
disoccupazione e politica monetaria Etas, 1998, §4.1. 
9 Apart from the Thatcher government. 
10 BEVERIDGE, J. Il piano Beveridge. La relazione di sir W. Beveridge al governo britannico 
sulla protezione sociale. Rapporto ufficiale, 1943. 
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convinced that the compromise for accepting the euro would weaken 
and worsen its freedom of decisions. 
As mentioned above, the second point for building an Oca is the 
existence of a high labour mobility11. From this point of view it is 
evident the lack of such mobility in the EU area. Lack due to a 
number of important reasons such as, differences in the language12, 
culture, law, uses, traditions etc... Therefore, it might be possible that 
one currency, the euro, will not fill all the gaps involved by such 
differences or, at least, will not be a substitute for them, unless a 
higher degree of social feeling and cultural harmonization between 
EU countries is achieved. Until then, the abandon of the pound, and 
exchange rate policy, might be an unreasonable cost to pay. 
 
3. On The Diversity of Monetary Policy in the UK and Euroland 
Once accepted the euro as the national currency, the UK will cease 
deciding its own monetary policy. However, while exchange rates 
policies will become a non-sense within Euroland, still the UK, once 
belonging to Euroland, has to share decisions, and management, on 
Euroland monetary policy. Such a policy can be only one, and 
precisely the one representing the expression of the emerging will of 
all the countries belonging to Euroland.  
In principle, national monetary authorities may have, and generally 
have, their own view about objectives to pursue and the means to 
achieve them. The diversity derives from different economic realities, 
perspectives and evaluations of such objectives and means. However, 
in the end, those authorities have to reach only one decision. 
Inevitable adjustments will be accepted, in the end, in the name of 
belonging to a union and, inevitably, part of the power of deciding 
their own monetary policy will be given to the new authority. As 
often happens in many fields of economics, social and political 
environment, and also in our case, there could be an interval of many 
(infinite) diversities, varying from the most insignificant to the 
                                                 
11 See, in particular, JOHNSON, C. In with the euro, out with the pound. The single currency 
for Britain Penguin Books, 1996. 
12 See, among many others, BINI SMAGHI, L. L’euro Il Mulino, 1998. 
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deepest of them. No matter about the former, but what will happen 
in case the latter prevails?  
Firstly, therefore, there is an urgent need to find out an acceptable 
way of making the smallest countries count when important decisions 
are taken. Secondly, should the (new) monetary policy institution have 
only one objective, for example, assuring price stability, or more 
objectives, say, price stability, growth, external equilibrium, etc…? 
Furthermore, should the monetary institution be absolutely 
independent of political power, transparent in its decisions, and 
accountant towards other institutional powers? What kind of 
intermediate targets should it firstly achieve, before achieving the final 
goal? The above are only some of the disquieting, or at least unease, 
questions which may arise when trying to tackle the delicate problem 
for a country to cease part of its monetary sovereignty to a new 
institution in the name of belonging to a union. 
 
3.1 On Diversities in the Objectives 
In principle, price stability (that is controlling the rate of inflation) is 
the final goal of any monetary policy. In order to achieve that goal 
monetary authorities, generally, use three means, that is, fixing the 
rate of interest, using open market operations and fixing the rate of 
the bank reserve-ratio. In the absence of diversities in the objectives 
to be achieved and considering the three means mentioned above, 
why should not the UK accept the euro? Rather, an acceptance of the 
euro would lead to more price stability in the advantage of both, the 
UK and Euroland. The reason might be that any monetary policy 
spreads its effects over the financial market, only if monetary policy 
actions are synchronised with financial markets. That happens if, and 
only if, the latter trusts the former. Financial markets are in synchrony 
with monetary policies only when, traditionally, monetary policy 
announcements have been proved to be true for a long time, which 
implies monetary policy credibility. It might well be that the UK is 
concerned about maintaining such a credibility once monetary policy 
decisions are to be shared with other culturally different oriented 
decision makers. 
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The reason lies in the definition of the different task of the British 
monetary authority, in comparison with that of the Ecb (European 
central bank), when dealing with inflation. The main goal of the Ecb, 
in terms of controlling inflation, is achieved when the rate of increase 
in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is, within the euro 
area, somewhere between 0% and 2%, however less than 2%13. To 
On the other hand the Bank of England fulfils that goal at a Retail 
Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) increasing at a 
maximum of 2,5%. However, due to a different method of calculating 
the rate of inflation in the UK and Euroland, it may happen, in the long 
term, that the two values might be coincident. What if they won’t? 
What if the value measured by the Ecb were lower than the other 
one? Will an EU deflationary process involve, in the UK too, a fall in 
employment and output?  
This is the reason why the Ecb, at the beginning of its activity, 
stated precisely that the above rate of 2% has to be referred to as a 
medium term rate. However, the definition of medium term itself, given 
by the Ecb, is still rather unclear. 
Further, how can one accept a 2% rate of increase in the HICP, as 
referring to the whole euro area when it is clear that the euro area is 
not yet a homogeneous area? In fact, prices for the same good vary 
not only between countries belonging to the euro area, but also 
between adjacent areas belonging to the same country or even to 
adjacent areas of the same town. It would be very unlikely that we will 
ever achieve price homogeneity across the different countries 
participating to the EU.  
                                                 
13 To be precise: “Although it clearly establishes the maintenance of price stability as the 
primary objective of the Ecb, the Treaty does not give a precise definition of what is meant by price 
stability. In order to specify this objective more precisely, the Governing Council of the Ecb 
announced the following quantitative definition on October 13th, 1998: “Price stability shall be 
defined as a year-on-year increase in the HICP for the euro area of below 2%” in Ecb The 
monetary policy of Ecb Ecb, Frankfurt am Main, 2001, p.38. Further, p.39, “First, neither 
prolonged inflation nor prolonged deflation is consistent with the definition. The phrase “below 2%” 
clearly delineates the upper boundary for the rate of measured HICP inflation that is consistent 
with price stability. At the same time, the use of the word “increase” in the definition shows that 
deflation, i.e., declines in the level of the HICP covers a wide range of consumer expenditure”.  
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In other words, one monetary policy for one (euro) area needs one 
common market, a market that, as already stated by the Treaty of 
Rome (1957), assures perfect mobility of persons, goods and capitals. 
Though undeniable progress in this respect has been made during the 
past half a century, yet there is a lack of flexibility in the adjustment of 
real and monetary variables that prevents the euro area from being a 
perfect competitive one. 
The uncertainties over a number of points involved by too many 
unanswered questions represent a threat to the above mentioned 
crucial requirement of any respectable monetary authority, that is the 
credibility of the latter with financial markets. In this respect one may 
well believe that UK, being aware of the long time British authority 
took to build up that credibility, might be concern about maintaining 
it alive once accepted the euro. 
However, neither the Bank of England, nor the Ecb have as only 
task that of assuring price stability. In fact, for example, the Bank of 
England has to help government to make effective its economic 
policy. The stability of prices appears to have the same importance as 
other government objectives. The Ecb has also a number of 
objectives belonging to the real economy such as employment, 
output, and so on. Therefore, apparently there is no difference 
between the two. But, in fact, the meaning is not the same; the 
former, through the monetary policy, is asked to co-operate with the 
government in implementing its economic policy14; the latter has, first 
of all, the task of assuring price stability, and only after having 
achieved that, looks at the real economy. The difference will appear 
clear in the next section.  
 
3.2 On the Diversities of the Means 
In the previous section we pointed out that the main objective of a 
monetary authority is price stability. However, is the path any 
monetary policy has to follow to achieve price stability unique? That 
is, is there any choice between a number of intermediate targets to be 
                                                 
14 Other objectives of the Bank of England are the maintaining of the stability of 
the financial system both at home and assure the efficiency of UK financial services. 
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achieved before achieving the final goal, or rather there is only one 
path. If there are different paths and therefore different intermediate 
targets, how should one choose between them? 
With respect to the first and secondary tasks, the Ecb monetary 
policy is based upon two pillars, a monetary pillar and a second one 
made up of a set of variables of the real economy. The first one, the 
so-called money targeting, that allows achieving price stability, is the 
Ecb’s main choice. It comes from the Ecb conviction that inflation is 
essentially a monetary phenomenon, and consequently it does depend 
on the quantity of money in the economy. Thus, once fixed, let us 
say, at a maximum of 2% the increase of the rate of inflation, 
supposing an increase of GDP by 1% and an increase of the money 
circulation velocity by 0,2%, the amount of money supply has to 
increase by 2,8%15. The second pillar sweetens the strong and true 
first one, as it shows an Ecb keeping also into account the real 
economy. Final decisions however are taken essentially on the basis of 
the first pillar, although not automatically: in such case expectations 
would lead to obvious speculative activity. 
The direct inflation targeting is the British authority’s choice according 
to which the rate of inflation represents both the intermediate target 
and the final goal. In other words, British monetary policy deals with 
the elimination of the gap between the expected and planned rate of 
inflation. That is pursued by monitoring and using any variables able 
to reduce that gap, not only the quantity of money supplied. At the 
same time, the whole of its action is extremely transparent towards 
public and, broadly speaking, the financial markets. Therefore, it is 
implicit in our example that, by accepting the euro the UK has to 
replace its direct inflation targeting with the money targeting. That 
might carry on a high cost indeed for the UK because of a number of 
reasons.  
                                                 
15 According to the quantitative theory of money, ∆m=∆p+∆y-∆v, where m is the 
quantity of money, y is the real GDP, v is the circulation velocity of money. Thus 
2,8%=2%+1%-0,2%. 
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The first reason is linked to the concept of the neutrality of the 
money16, which appears to belong to the Ecb, and does not belong to 
Bank of England. Consequently, the Bank of England has to help 
government in implementing its policy, while pursuing its duty of 
price stability; the Ecb only addresses a yearly report on its activity to 
the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council of 
Europe. On the other hand, since in the British view the money is non 
neutral then the Bank of England is accountant towards the government.  
The second reason is a consequence of the first one. In fact, the 
multi-purpose Bank of England task (to assure the stability of prices 
and help government in realizing its economic policy) implies a co-
operative action with government. Monetary policy and fiscal policy 
are to co-operate to achieve price stability and growth. There are two 
objectives and two means. Co-operation does not mean the presence 
of a leader and follower. On the contrary, since there are two 
objectives and two independent means to be used to achieve them, it 
is respected the well known Tinbergen principle, according to which a 
model with predetermined objectives (i.e.with n independent 
objectives) must have n independent means and all of them have to 
co-operate altogether to the achievements of the objectives17. The 
Ecb philosophy of the two pillars yields to the inevitable consequence 
of giving priority to monetary variables when compared with the real 
ones: the Tinbergen principle is not satisfied18. For example suppose 
that, in the absence of coordination, the rate of interest is increased in 
order to reduce inflation and that, at the same time, government 
                                                 
16 Money is considered neutral if her variations do not affect variations in the real 
variables, but only in the level of prices. 
17 TINBERGEN, J. Economic policy: principles and design North Holland Publishing Co., 
Amsterdam, 1956. 
18 It might be argued that the Tinbergen principle is not only respected by the Ecb, 
but even stated by the Treaty (of the European Union): the Ecb has to act in 
harmony with the Ecofin Council and the Economic and Financial Committee. 
However, the Ecb co-operative activity cannot be interpreted and put in practice as 
the Tinbergen principle would suggest, because of the simple reason that, once 
again by statute, the Ecb takes, primarily, responsibility for the stability of prices. 
That comes from the conviction according to which, without assuring the stability 
of prices, any economic policy is destined to fail. 
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decides an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce the rate of 
unemployment. Monetary policy will fade away fiscal policy 
expectations, contributing to lead the economy towards undesired 
effects. It would not appear hazardous to imagine the British not 
willing to weaken their co-ordination philosophy and respect of the 
Tinbergen principle. 
 
4. The Independence of the Ecb 
The creation of the Ecb proved to be a revival of the ancient debate 
about whether a central bank should, or should not, be independent 
of the political power19. As to the Ecb, the principle of independence 
from the political power is stated by the art. 107 of the Treaty: “When 
exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by 
this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national 
central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take 
instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a 
Member State or from any other body….” The passive defence of such a 
principle is institutional, being exerted from external interferences 
when Ecb is pursuing statutory objectives, personal20, through the 
process of nomination and the length of the charges21 and functional, 
since the Ecb is given a number of financial and accountant tools and 
the responsibility of drawing up the Escb (European System of 
Central Bank) consolidated balance sheet22. The active defence of that 
principle takes the form of the prohibition, stated by the art. 104 of 
the Treaty “Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the Ecb or 
                                                 
19See, among many others, HABIB, M.M. Saggio sull’indipendenza della banca centrale in 
Studi economici, n.70, 2000/1; SPAGNOLO L.V. The Role of the European System of 
Central Banks in the European Integration Process in Building the New Europe, Vol. I: 
The Single Market and Monetary Unification, edited by Baldassarri M. and Mundell 
R. The Macmillan Press, London and New York, 1993. 
20 The same art. 107 “The Community institutions and bodies and the government of the 
Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the 
decision-making bodies of the Ecb or of the national central banks in the performance of their 
tasks.” 
21 The art.11 of the Protocol (of the Treaty) statues the length of the charge of the 
members of the Executive Board in eight years. 
22 See Protocol, Chapter V, art. 25-27. 
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with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as “national 
central banks”) in favour of Community institutions or bodies governed by public 
law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the 
purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt 
instruments.” and the art. 104 A “Any measure, not based on prudential 
considerations, establishing privileged access by Community institutions or bodies, 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies 
governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial 
institutions shall be prohibited.” In fact, the independence of the Ecb 
from the political power is a condition sine qua non of the existence of 
the Ecb herself. Moreover, a number of economic models, as the 
representative agent model by Rogoff23, have been developed to advocate 
the thesis according to which the Ecb should have had to minimize 
the function of the loss 
 
L=(p-p*)2 + b(u-u*)2 
 
where L is the loss, p-p* is the difference between current and planned 
rate of inflation, u-u* is the difference between current and planned rate 
of unemployment and b is the value the minimizer assigns to the 
relative importance between inflation and unemployment24. 
According to the model, the lower the value assigned by the central 
banker (the agent) to b, the more conservative she is. Her credibility is 
higher, the lower the value assigned to b since a low value means 
more control on the rate of inflation. Consequently, at the beginning 
of the Ecb activity, it was essential for the Ecb to show that it was 
                                                 
23 BARRO, R. and GORDON, D. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy 
in Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp.101-120; KYDLAND, F.E. and 
PRESCOTT, E.E. Rules rather than discretion, the time inconsistency of optimal plans in Journal 
of Political Economy, 1977. 
24In the Rogoff model, the agent (the conservative central banker), optimizes the 
trade off between inflation and unemployment minimizing the Loss function. In fact, 
she cannot reach such objective because of the simple reason that she has no 
autonomy in deciding both the rate of inflation and unemployment. She can only fix 
the former as objective, and not the latter. In any case a central banker is said to be 
conservative if she assigns more importance to the rate of inflation than to 
unemployment. 
 18
conservative, above all, that it was even more conservative than most 
conservative existing central banks. However, is the priority given to 
the rate of inflation over unemployment justified?25, is it true that the 
degree of credibility of a central banker increases with the degree of 
conservativeness?, is it true that more conservativeness means more 
credibility?, is it true that more independence means more credibility 
and, hence, more conservativeness? Most important, who should the 
minimizer be: the representative agent (the central banker) or, rather, 
the society, that is to say, the government chosen by the society? 
Further, once accepted the idea of a rate of inflation mainly linked to 
the quantity supplied of money, would not the Ecb, with its monetary 
policy, make dependent the fiscal policies of the governments of the 
member countries? These are only some of the questions needing a 
satisfactory answer.  
The British model of central bank, though is left independent in the 
accomplishment of the main task, on the other hand, it is essentially 
considered, as explained above, an institution helping government in 
reaching the goals set by the government itself. That comes from the 
fundamental UK conception of the non-neutrality of the money.  
However, the principle of independence might be also seen in a 
slightly different way. In fact, is really the Ecb an institution 
independent, super-partes, above the will of the member States 
expressed by their Governors? And how many activities are, still now, 
maintained by the national central banks and how many delegated to 
the Ecb26? Finally, is the monetary policy really conceived by the Ecb 
                                                 
25 SPAGNOLO, L.V. La convergenza di Maastricht: una misura della divergenza Giappichelli, 
Torino, 1997. 
26 Graziani A. thinks of the Escb chosen as a hybrid one. Apparentely, it looks like a 
highly centralized system in which every decision is made by the Ecb, which 
finances directly national banks of the member countries. That can be seen by the 
Ecb balance sheet, where the assets include financements in favour of national 
banks of the member countries and do not those in favour of the national central 
banks. However, the system is deeply modified being the implementation of the 
monetary policy assigned to the single national central banks, to which has been left 
a set of large powers. GRAZIANI, A. La politica monetaria della Banca Centrale Europea  
in Rivista Italiana degli Economisti n. 2004/1 Supplement dedicated to the works of 
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or, rather, influenced by the national bankers views?27 If the monetary 
is influenced by national bankers view then it would be a difficult task 
for the UK to see its view accepted! In all cases, the Ecb 
independence can only be relative: it cannot be absolute, since it 
depends on the international rate of exchange systems28. Keeping into 
account the international rate of exchange context, there could be 
different views on what policy be advisable. At the same time all of 
them could probably be justifiable on the basis of different 
arguments. However, they will imply different consequences in 
different member countries. 
 
5 A Pragmatic View 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair described the decision on whether 
or not joining the euro as the most important decision of the Labour 
party and promised to call a referendum on the issue. As a 
consequence of the Labour pro-Euro policy, in 1997 the Treasury 
announced five economic tests on UK entry to the Euro. The tests 
are essentially based on assessing the convergence of the UK business 
cycle with the European business cycle; assessing the degree of 
flexibility of the UK economy to adapt and adjust to changes; 
considering the effect on investment in the UK; considering the 
                                                                                                              
the 44th yearly scientific meeting, Salerno, October, 24th-25th, 2003, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, Italy. 
27The art.10 of the Protocol of the Treaty statues “In accordance with Article 109a(1) of 
this Treaty, the Governing Council shall comprise the members of the Executive Board of the 
ECB and the Governors of the central banks.” At present, the Executive Committee 
consists of six members (art. 11), consequently the Governor Council includes the 
six members of the Executive Committee and twelve national central banks 
Governors. Though the Executive Committee decisions are independent, those of 
the national central bank Governors might be not. In the case when Euroland were 
hit by symmetric shock, the Governing Council decisions might coincide with the 
Executive Committee ones. But what will happen in case of an asymmetric shock? 
See the interesting discussion of DE GRAUWE, P., DEWACHTER, P., and AKSOY, Y. 
The European central bank decisions, rules and macroeconomic performance in CEPR, 
Discussion Paper n. 2067. 
28 SPAGNOLO, L. V. L’equilibrio..,op.cit., pp.174-175; SPAGNOLO L.V. European Economic 
Convergence and The International Monetary System in De Pecunia, (number dedicated to 
the memory of Robert Triffin), Bruxelles,1993. 
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advantages for the financial services sector once joined the Euro; 
finally, considering employment and growth prospects. 
Despite the five economic tests, for quite few people the decision 
to join the Euro will not be an easy one, and it will be based more on 
the “emotional facts” of having to scratch the pound than economic 
concerns. 
The Treasury considers the test on convergence an important step 
towards a successful single currency. It says that, in order for the UK 
economy to fully be able to benefit from a single currency, it has to 
converge with Europe and show that the convergence is sustainable. 
With regard convergence, in the past the UK`s economic cycle has 
been, most of the times, divergent and more volatile than others in 
Europe and more linked to the USA cycle. Today, Britain is 
experiencing a period of good economic growth and stability while 
most of the European countries (see for example France, Germany, 
and Italy amongst the others) on the other hand, experience a low 
growth with relatively high level of unemployment. The British cycle 
therefore seems to be still invariably out of phase with respect to 
most of the major European countries. Furthermore, the UK 
mortgage market historically depends on variable interest rates while 
the European market is mainly characterised by fixed interest rate. 
The boom in housing markets with the consequent increase in the 
value of properties across the country has increased the borrowing 
power of the UK residents. The consequent increase in disposable 
income has increased consumption. On the other hand as a 
consequence of the boom in housing market, house prices have seen 
a two-digit increase in various areas of the country. The different rate 
of borrowing between Euroland and UK, and the house price 
inflation might be more than a simple concern for Tony Blair in order 
to schedule a reasonable time for joining the Euro. In fact, this 
concern has been recently expressed clearly by Gordon Brown when 
he announced that the UK was not ready yet for the euro and the 
Prime Minister accepted the chancellor`s view. 
Another important test is about the flexibility or ability of the 
economy to adjust to changes. In fact as we stressed in the previous 
sections a single currency leads to a loss of domestic control over 
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monetary policy. Given the risk of future shocks, firms would need to 
be flexible in terms of pricing and margins in order to respond to 
asymmetric shocks, and employees would need to increase their skills 
in order to adapt to changes in the labour market.  
With regard investment the treasury believes that a single currency, 
by creating an area of low inflation and high stability, and by 
removing currency changeover costs, would attract investment in 
Britain. However, perhaps the impact of the euro on the thousands of 
small business across the country might have been miss-calculated. In 
fact, the adoption of the euro will imply additional costs deriving 
from new accounting systems, price labels etc…Therefore, small 
business will not benefit from it and will pass on to customers the 
increase in costs by rounding up prices. 
The City of London has always been one of the major financial 
centres in the world. According to the Treasury the euro will affect 
financial services immediately, therefore it is important to see if the 
City is prepared for it and if the introduction of the euro is 
advantageous for the sector. It is not difficult for anyone involved in 
the financial sector to see that the level of euro transactions on the 
UK stock exchange and secondary markets has been growing fast. 
Therefore, a part from operational costs and operational risk involved 
with the introduction of the euro, the City should be able to fully 
adapt in short time to the new currency. 
The final test concerns employment and growth. The introduction 
of the euro should lead to low inflation and high stability for the 
whole Euro area (Britain included) and therefore a high growth and 
employment. However, as mentioned above, convergence and 
flexibility are two important factors in order to achieve these goals. 
Therefore a decision on whether or not this test has been satisfied is 
to be taken by the Treasury by looking at the “fundamental” structure 
of the UK economy and considering flexibility and convergence. 
However, it is unclear what convergence may imply in this context 
given that the UK GDP has been growing much faster than the GDP 
in most of the largest economies in Europe! 
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6. On the Political Reasons29 
According to Disraeli30 Great Britain is governed by its Parliament, not by its 
logic 31. That was to lay stress on the British undeniable and 
unquestionable principle of national sovereignty, which is the legal 
capability of the national decision maker institutions to make their 
choices without being subject to any external restrictions. Coherently, 
from the very beginning of the European integration process32, UK 
has been the advocate of the inter-government confederal model 
opposite to the supranational federalist one33. As known, the main 
difference between those two models is that only in the former 
national sovereignty is assured. On the other hand, the latter keeps 
into account either the interests and needs of the members, regions or 
                                                 
29The subject of this § needs, obviously, a width and depth well beyond the 
objective of this paper, which only represents an attempt to give an understandable 
and condensed synthesis of the reasons why the UK might not been keen to joint 
the euro. 
30DISRAELI, BENJAMIN (1804-81), 1st Earl of Beaconsfield, British Conservative 
prime minister (1868, 1874-80). 
31BOGDANOR V. The United Kingdom and the European Union: light on the relationship in 
Britain in Europe, The London School of Economics and Political Science, p.28. 
32 DUFF A. Britain and Europe. The different relationship, in WESTLAKE M. (editor) The 
European Union beyond Amsterdam. New concepts of European integration, Routledge, 1998. 
Zurcher A.J. La lotta per l’Europa unita 1940-1958, in Cultura e società n. 29, Opere 
nuove, 1963. 
33 As we know, the debate on federalism against confederalism comes out at from 
the functionalism, a doctrine according to which the form of a thing should be determined by 
its use. For a definition of the term functionalism, see COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
Glasgow, 1990, p.614. In the European integration process, the functionalist 
pragmatic view was applied to economic sectors of the economy through common 
policies to be managed by common supranational agencies, and leaded to the 
throwing down of the custom barriers to build a common way to political sectors. 
The functionalism adaptability to the member states needs was, at the same time, its 
strength and its weakness. The development of common economic policies was not 
followed by net abandon of the political sovereignty. On the contrary, the crude 
reality represented by the endless and still unsolved debate between federalism and 
confederalism re-emerged. PINDER J. The building of the European Union 3rd edition, 
Oxford University Press, 1998. WALLACE W. Less than a Federation, more than a regime: 
the Community as a political system in ….Policy in the European Community, John Wiley & 
Sons, 1990. 
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States, that it is part of, or those of the new entity, the federal State. 
The tasks of the members and of the new entity should have to be 
exactly defined. EU, though represents none of the two models, 
having elements of both, it is moving towards the direction of the 
latter. Therefore, Disraeli sentence is no longer a mirror of the 
current national sovereignty.  
EU laws are based upon the self-executing, supremacy and pre-emption 
principles. The UK, with the European Act of 1972, accepted the 
self-executing, or direct applicability principle34 and consequently its 
logical consequence, that is the supremacy principle, according to 
which community law prevails over national law, principle that is the 
same for all the member countries35. The supremacy principle 
revolutionises member countries law system, by transferring part of 
the national sovereignty to the Union in the name of the principle 
that there cannot be a case of clashing interest between any of the 
member countries and the Union. However, since such a principle is 
more a perspective or a wish than a reality, it is understandable that all 
the member countries have difficulties in accepting it, as it is. Once 
accepted it, in the case of a clashing law, the UK would be judged by 
the European Court of Justice. Therefore, in order to accept that 
principle, the UK should be convinced that the democracy power is 
stronger and better represented in the community law system than at 
home, and that a democratic deficit no longer exists at the heart of 
the EU making law process. It is also because of this, that once 
accepted the euro, since the Ecb will be the EU monetary policy 
decision maker, the UK will have to accept the principles of the 
neutrality of the money and independence of the Ecb, which 
contrasts his traditional view.  
Regarding the pre-emption principle36, it is known that, under the 
pressures of a number of member States, including UK and Germany, 
                                                 
34 KENT P. Law of the European Union 3d Ed., Pearson Education, 2001, p.58. See also 
eurotreaties.com. 
35 CONSTANTINESCU L.J. La specificité du droit communautaire in Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Européen, 1965. 
36 The pre-emption principle is the purchase of or the right to purchase property in advance of or 
in preference to others . See COLLINS, op. cit., u.v. pre-emption, p. 1208. 
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it became, with The Treaty, the subsidiarity principle. Such principle is 
based upon the presumption that, within the EU, the State has 
competence in making law unless not explicitly assigned to the 
Union37. Generally, federalism needs this principle to be accepted and, 
as made in the case of the Legislative Scottish Assembly (i.e. the so-
called devolved matters), clearly defined.  
On the contrary, the subsidiarity principle in the EU seems to work 
in the opposite direction. That is it assigns the more and more making 
law competence to the Union and the less and less to the member 
States, in the view of building up a super State in which a dangerous 
hierarchy might appropriate the member States making law 
competence38.  
Participating to a Union, in itself, it needs one identity. A European 
Union needs its own identity, which means one feeling and one will 
to belong to the same Union well beyond belonging to the member 
country. Furthermore, a Federal Union needs the right interpretation 
of the subsidiarity principle, that is leaving the law making process to 
the member states in the respect of their diversities in any subject but 
those for which the “common feeling” delegates the Union.  
At present, it is hard to recognize the existence of one feeling of 
belonging to the same economic, social, cultural and political reality. 
In other words it does not seem possible to believe in the existence of 
one voice for the European Union within itself and towards the rest 
of the world, before having built one identity for one European 
people.  
                                                 
37 CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REASEARCH La distribuzione dei poteri nell’Unione 
Europea. Il principio di sussidiarietà nel processo d’integrazione europea Il Mulino, 1995; 
BECK C. H. European Union law: cases. Frank Emmert, 1999; VANDAMME J. European 
Federalism. Opportunity or Utopia? In WESTLAKE M. (editor) The European Union beyond 
Amsterdam. New concepts of European Integration Routledge, 1998. 
38 FERRARI BRAVO L., MOAVERO MILANESI E. Lezioni di Diritto Comunitario 3rd 
Edition, Edizione Scientifica, 2000. Delors expects an 80% legislation coming from 
the EU against a 20% of member States competence. See DE LEONARDIS M. 
L’integrazione europea e la Gran Bretagna in Rainero R.H. (editor) Storia dell’integrazione 
europea vol.II L’Europa dai Trattati di Roma alla caduta del muro di Berlino Marzorati 
Editore, 1997; GOZI S. Il governo dell’Europa Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000. 
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Moreover, while the EU institutional persisting democratic deficit 
needs many efforts to be reduced, the increasing community making 
law process is steadily increasing. At the same time, such process is 
not at all balanced by an increasing accountability of the institutions 
representing it.  
The UK might not be encouraged to replace the pound for the 
euro until a true EU identity will have emerged.  
In our view, the UK reasons for not joining the euro should not be 
seen as steril, vanishing or disrespectful of the EU integration 
process. Rather, all the possible reasons mentioned above, ought to 
be seen as to contribute to the creation of a better Europe. 
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